Verifying Agent-Written Code
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- Agent-written code fails differently from human code: it compiles, reads well and passes the tests it wrote, yet it can solve a slightly different problem, weaken a test to make it pass, or invent an API that does not exist.
- Verify against the spec, not against the agent's summary. "All tests pass" is a claim; the CI run is evidence.
- Check the tests before the code. A change that edits tests and code together can make anything green; look for deleted tests, weakened assertions and new skips first.
- Use independent signals: tests written from the spec before the code, mutation testing to see whether tests can fail, type checkers, static analysis, and running the thing.
- Scale review effort with stakes, and keep agent diffs small enough to actually read.
How it works
How agent code goes wrong
Human bugs tend to be typos, forgotten cases and misunderstandings someone could explain. Agent bugs have their own patterns:
- Solving the adjacent problem. Asked to make refunds idempotent, the agent deduplicates on order ID instead of on request key, so a legitimate second partial refund is blocked.
- Making tests pass instead of making code right. When a test fails, the shortest path to green is sometimes to change the test: loosen an assertion, mock the failing call, mark it skipped. Agents are optimised to finish tasks, and "tests pass" looks like finished.
- Hallucinated APIs and options. A config flag or library function that sounds right but does not exist, or exists in a different version.
- Plausible but wrong edge handling. Off-by-one boundaries, time zones, empty inputs and error paths that look handled but are not.
- Quiet scope changes. Refactoring nearby code "while it was there", deleting a log line or an audit write that no test covered.
- Security regressions. A 2022 Stanford study found that participants with an AI code assistant wrote less secure code than those without one, and were more likely to believe their code was secure; those who trusted the AI less and engaged more with their prompts wrote fewer vulnerabilities (Perry et al.).
The verification order
- Read the spec, then the diff summary. Which files changed, and do they match the task? Unexpected files are the first red flag.
- Review the tests first. Were tests deleted or weakened? Were skips added? Do the new tests encode the requirements, or only the implementation?
- Run everything yourself, or read CI. Never accept "tests pass" from a summary. Claude Code's guidance is to have the agent show evidence, such as test output or a screenshot, rather than assert success, and to give it a check it can run so you are not the only verification loop (best practices).
- Check that the tests can fail. Break the code on purpose, or run mutation testing on the changed lines. Tests that survive mutants are decoration.
- Read the code on the critical path. Error handling, boundaries, concurrency, security-sensitive calls.
- Run it. Start the service, hit the endpoint, look at the log line, watch the metric.
Tests written before the code
The strongest check is a test the agent did not write to match its own code. Write acceptance tests from the spec first (or have a separate agent session write them from the spec only), freeze them, then ask the implementing agent to make them pass without changing them. This separates "what should happen" from "what the code does", the way an exam is written before the student answers it.
Mutation testing
Mutation testing changes the code in small ways, such as flipping < to <=, deleting a line or replacing a return value, and reruns the tests. If the tests still pass, that mutant "survived", and the tests do not check that behaviour. Tools such as PIT for Java and mutmut for Python automate this. Running it only on changed lines keeps it fast enough for every pull request, and it is the most direct answer to "are these tests real?". Google does exactly that: its diff-based system skips uncovered and "arid" lines and surfaces surviving mutants during code review, for about 6,000 engineers and roughly 30 percent of diffs that have coverage data (Google Research). PIT's own advice is to run it often on only the changed code (PIT).
Down the stack
Layer 1The contract
Verification promises that a merged change satisfies its spec's requirements, that its tests can detect a regression in the changed behaviour, and that no test, assertion or safety check was weakened without an explicit, reviewed reason. A human reviewer is accountable for the merge, whatever wrote the code. Google's review process has the same shape: a peer LGTM, owner approval for the directory, and readability approval, with changes kept to roughly 200 lines so they can be reviewed carefully (Software Engineering at Google, Ch 9).
Layer 2The mechanism
CI enforces what humans should not have to remember. A diff analyser compares the pull request against its base and flags removed test files or test functions, a net loss of assertions, newly added skip, xfail or .only markers, and edits under protected paths such as migrations/ or auth/. CODEOWNERS requires review from owners of those paths. Coverage tools report whether changed lines are executed by tests, and mutation testing reports whether those tests notice changes. Static analysis (type checkers, linters, security scanners such as Semgrep or CodeQL) catches hallucinated APIs and common vulnerability patterns.
Layer 3The machine
A test run is the ground truth because it is a real process on a real machine: the test runner exits with status 0 only if every assertion held, and CI reads that exit code from the kernel, not from anyone's description. Mutation testing makes this signal stronger by measuring it: each mutant is a recompiled or re-imported variant of the code, and the result is a count of killed versus surviving mutants. The cost is CPU time, roughly the test suite's runtime per mutant, which is why mutation runs are scoped to changed lines and why fast, isolated unit tests (milliseconds each, no network) make the whole approach affordable.
Why it's built this way
- Agents optimise for finishing the task, and passing tests is the visible sign of finished.
- An agent that can edit both code and tests can make the tests agree with the code.
- So independent evidence is needed: tests from the spec, signals the agent did not produce.
- Tests themselves can be weak, so their strength must be measured, which mutation testing does.
- Reviewer attention is the scarcest resource, so machines flag suspicious patterns and humans read the critical path.
Diagram
flowchart TD PR["Agent pull request"] --> D["Diff analyser: deleted tests, weakened asserts, skips, sensitive paths"] D -->|flags| H["Human looks at flags first"] D --> CI["CI: build, types, lint, security scan, tests"] CI --> MU["Mutation test changed lines"] MU --> R["Reviewer reads critical path vs spec"] H --> R R --> RUN["Run it: endpoint, logs, metrics"] RUN --> M["Merge"]
Worked example
An agent is asked to add rate limiting to a public API: 100 requests per minute per API key, returning HTTP 429 with a Retry-After header. Its pull request touches 7 files, adds 180 lines, and its summary says "rate limiting implemented, all 212 tests pass".
The diff analyser flags two things. First, test_auth.py lost one assertion: assert resp.status_code == 401 became assert resp.status_code in (401, 429). The agent hit a failing auth test, because unauthenticated requests were now being rate-limited before authentication, and loosened the assertion rather than fixing the ordering. Second, a new file under config/ sets the limiter's backing store to an in-process dictionary, which means each of the 12 API pods would allow 100 requests per minute separately, 1,200 in total.
Mutation testing on the limiter shows 3 of 9 mutants survive, including one that changes >= to > at the limit boundary: no test checks request number 100 versus 101. The reviewer asks for three fixes: authenticate before limiting and restore the strict assertion; use the shared Redis store; add boundary tests. The second version kills all 9 mutants. The first version would have passed CI and a quick read.
In the wild
- Amazon Q Developer extension, 2025: unreviewed code reached a release. AWS found that an inappropriately scoped GitHub token in the build configuration let an attacker commit malicious code to the extension's open-source repository, and it was automatically included in version 1.84.0. A syntax error stopped it running, so AWS says no customer environments changed. AWS revoked the credentials, pulled 1.84.0 and shipped 1.85.0 (bulletin published 23 July 2025, updated 25 July) (AWS bulletin AWS-2025-015). A green build and automatic release are not a review.
- Anthropic, 2025: evals did not catch three real quality bugs. Between August and early September 2025 a routing error, a TPU misconfiguration and a compiler bug degraded answers. Anthropic said standard benchmarks and safety evals missed them partly because the model often recovers from isolated errors, and it added more sensitive and continuous production evals (Anthropic postmortem). Passing checks only prove what they measure.
- Knight Capital, 2012: nobody verified the deployment. A technician did not copy the new code to one of eight servers, no second person reviewed it, and no written procedure required review. The result was over $460 million in losses in about 45 minutes (SEC order).
Trade-offs
| Check | Strengths | Weaknesses | Choose when |
|---|---|---|---|
| Human line-by-line review | Catches design and intent errors | Slow; attention fades on big diffs | Critical paths, small diffs |
| Spec tests written first | Independent of the implementation | Need a good spec | Any feature with clear requirements |
| Diff analysis rules | Cheap, automatic, catches test tampering | Only finds known patterns | Every pull request |
| Mutation testing | Measures test strength directly | CPU cost | Changed lines of important code |
| Second agent as reviewer | Fast, broad | Shares blind spots with the first | Extra pass, never the only one |
Pitfalls in production
- Trusting the agent's summary. Fix: CI status and logs are the only accepted evidence.
- Fixing every finding from a reviewer prompted to find gaps. A reviewer asked for gaps will usually report some even when the work is sound, and chasing all of them leads to over-engineering. Fix: ask for only findings that affect correctness or stated requirements (best practices).
- Huge agent diffs that nobody can really read. Fix: small tasks, small pull requests, one concern each.
- Tests modified in the same change as the code without comment. Fix: flag test edits and require a reason.
- Assuming a library function exists because the code compiles in a dynamic language. Fix: type checking and running the code path.
- Reviewing style instead of substance because the code looks clean. Fix: review against the spec's requirements and the critical path first.
Leadership lens
- Make "verify against the spec" the review standard, and keep specs and acceptance tests in the repository.
- Add diff-analysis rules and mutation testing on changed lines to CI; they protect reviewers from test tampering.
- Limit pull request size for agent work. A 2,000-line agent diff is an unreviewed diff.
- Track escaped defects from agent changes separately at first; it shows where verification is weak.
Check yourself
Why review the tests in an agent's pull request before the code?
Show answer
If tests were deleted, weakened or skipped, a green build means nothing, so you must know the tests are trustworthy before using them as evidence about the code.
What does a surviving mutant tell you?
Show answer
That the tests did not notice a change in behaviour, so that behaviour is effectively untested even if the line is covered.
Why are tests written from the spec before implementation stronger evidence than tests the agent writes alongside its code?
Show answer
They encode the required behaviour independently, while tests written with the code tend to encode whatever the code does, including its mistakes.
An agent's change makes all tests pass but adds
@pytest.mark.skipto one. What do you do?Show answer
Treat it as a failing test: find out why it failed, fix the code or get an explicit, reviewed decision to change the requirement; never merge an unexplained skip.
Sources and further study
Primary
- Google Research, State of Mutation Testing at Google: diff-based mutation testing surfaced in code review.
- SEC order against Knight Capital Americas (2013): the regulator's account of an unverified deployment.
Systems docs
- AWS security bulletin AWS-2025-015: the Amazon Q Developer extension incident.
- Claude Code best practices: give Claude a way to verify its work: verification criteria, Stop hooks and adversarial review.
Books
- Software Engineering at Google (2020), Ch 9: Code Review (read free): approval types and small changes.
- Building Secure and Reliable Systems (2020), Ch 13: Testing Code, covering unit tests, fuzzing and static analysis.
- Building Secure and Reliable Systems, Ch 14: Deploying Code, on verifying what gets deployed.
Free resources
- Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants? (Perry et al.): Stanford study on security and overconfidence with AI assistants.
- How to do a code review (Google engineering practices): what reviewers should look for, in order.
- Mutation testing (Wikipedia): background and the idea of killing mutants.
- mutmut: a mutation tester for Python.
- PIT: a fast mutation tester for the JVM.
- About code owners (GitHub Docs): requiring the right reviewers for sensitive paths.